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A VISION OF A SEAMLESS AND ACCOUNTABLE SYSTEM OF EDUCATION FOR FLORIDA E. T. York, Chancellor Emeritus State University System of Florida This paper will present a governance plan for Florida's education system that is not only seamless and accountable in design but one that will also fill a vacuum that exists in the plan recently put forth by the Legislature. This paper is premised upon the fact that an intermediate statewide governing board for the university system is needed in order to assure the seamlessness and accountability sought by the Legislature. In 1998, Floridians adopted a constitutional amendment on Florida's education system that will become effective in January of 2003. At that time, the elected Commissioner of Education will be replaced by a commissioner appointed by the State Board of Education, which, in turn, will have been appointed by the Governor. In its spring 2000 session, the Legislature passed "Florida's Education Governance Reorganization Act of 2000," an interim implementation plan for the new statewide system of education. Among other things, the Legislature said the reorganization should
In order to plan for 2003, the act also created a "transition commission," whose duty is "to assess Florida's current educational system and make recommendations to achieve the true systemic changes demanded by this act." It appears, therefore, that the act recognizes the fact that the reorganization of Florida's education system is still "a work in progress" and specific plans "to achieve the true systemic changes demanded by the act" must be made before 2003. The purpose of this paper will be to set forth a plan that will accomplish the legislatively mandated goals of a seamless system and the highest level of accountability for each section of our state's vast educational system, which consists of public schools, community colleges, universities, and non-public educational institutions. THE NEW STATE BOARD OF EDUCATION The Legislature has placed overall and ultimate responsibility for the state's entire education system in a new State Board of Education and, presumably, will hold that statewide governing board and the Governor, who appoints it, ultimately responsible for whatever transpires at our educational institutions-kindergarten through graduate and professional schools. As a result of these dramatic changes in education governance, the question becomes: what responsibilities and powers should a seven-member Board of Education possess in order to effectively govern the four major segments of the state's education system? The State Board of Education would, logically, have the following functions:
For this plan to be functional and workable, the board would then need to delegate major administrative and operational responsibilities to the four major divisions. One should recognize, however, that the nature of the responsibilities to be delegated to the four divisions of the state's education system will differ greatly. K-12 The fact that the constitution assigns the governance of K-12 institutions to local school boards makes its governance needs much different from those of the other three divisions. While K-12 relies primarily on local control and governance, it would appear that even K-12 may need to have some coordinating responsibilities handled at the state level. This might include such things as state or federally mandated programs as are now being coordinated by the State Department of Education. But, obviously, there is no need for a governing body for K-12 at the state level. NON-PUBLIC EDUCATION The state-imposed governance needs in non-public education are obviously quite different from those involving public systems. The Task Force, and ultimately the Legislature, should be concerned primarily with how state supported programs at non-public institutions can and should be an integral part of a seamless system of education in Florida and how those non-public institutions can be held fully accountable for the use of state funds in support of their programs. It would appear inappropriate for the state to impose a governance system for non-public education systems since these institutions have their own system of governance. COMMUNITY COLLEGES The governance of community colleges, on the other hand, is an appropriate subject for consideration. It is important, at the outset, to understand that the basic mission of a community college is quite different from the role and mission of a university. For example, all community colleges can offer the same basic low-cost programs that all lower division students everywhere should have: reading, writing, mathematics, and an exposure to the sciences-physical, biological and social. There should also be no problem of having relatively low cost, duplicating community college programs throughout the state wherever there is evidence of need. Duplication of programs at this level is appropriate and, therefore, is to be expected. On the other hand, high-cost graduate and professional programs at the universities should be authorized at a university only when there is a clear-cut and justifiable need. Otherwise, there will likely be expensive and unnecessary duplication of programs. To keep this from happening will require some form of state-level oversight and control within the university system. The Task Force will likely consider whether community colleges need some form of a statewide coordinating body, similar to what they have now. However, I see no need for a governing body for our community colleges similar to that proposed for universities. UNIVERSITIES There is strong evidence of the need for universities to have an intermediate governing body between the State Board of Education and university boards of trustees (assuming that university boards of trustees are authorized). There are several possible titles for such a board but, for clarity sake in this paper, let me refer to such a body as the "Board of Governors," since their role is to govern. The logic is overwhelming. If there is no statewide board with the power (delegated to it by the State Board of Education) to determine and oversee the role and scope of each university, the competition for programs and funds in the Legislature would be endless and destructive. The temptation for university boards of trustees to circumvent an appointed Chancellor would be great. It would be every institution for itself and would ultimately set university against university and legislative delegations against one another, with the welfare and programmatic ambitions of each institution influenced by the power of its own legislative delegation. Expensive programs would proliferate and the effectiveness of state dollars would be seriously eroded. At the Jacksonville meeting of the Task Force, John Winn distributed a list of statutorily mandated responsibilities that are now carried out by the State Board of Education, the Board of Regents, and the universities. This list included 41 statutorily mandated responsibilities for the regents. This list, however, may not be complete since, for example, there is no mention of the fact that the Board of Regents is designated the "employer" for collective bargaining purposes in chapter 447, Florida Statues. Under the constitution, these functions must continue to be performed. Most of the responsibilities now assigned to the regents by statute are of such a nature that they could not logically be delegated to the individual universities-responsibilities such as the allocation of programs and resources among the institutions. Moreover, the new State Board of Education is likely to have neither the time nor capacity to perform many of these university system operational functions and still carry out its primary role. A university system Board of Governors is essential for the continued well-being of our universities and Florida's education system. In such a plan, the Board of Governors would not only operate under and report to the State Board of Education, it would receive its authority by delegation from the SBE. The delegated operational authority from the State Board of Education would logically include responsibility for such things as comprehensive and detailed planning for the university system, the allocation of programs and resources among the institutions in response to statewide and local educational needs, approval of the appointment and termination (if necessary) of university presidents, conferring lifetime tenure on faculty members, the conduct of collective bargaining for university faculty and professional employees, and, in cooperation with the SBE, Governor, and Legislature, be responsible for financial planning and budgeting for the university system. Most of the other responsibilities can and should be delegated to institutional boards of trustees and presidents. The "Florida Education Government Act of 2000" calls for a chancellor to be appointed for each of the four divisions of education called for in the act. With the proposed Board of Governors for the University System, I would expect the chancellor to function as he now does for the University System. Logically, he/she would be the chief executive officer for the Board of Governors with a line of responsibility to both the Board of Governors and the Commissioner of Education, as is currently the case. Accordingly, it would seem appropriate for the chancellor to be appointed by the Board of Governors, subject to the approval of the Commissioner of Education. Collective Bargaining The nature of collective bargaining dramatically demonstrates why a Board of Governors is desirable, if not necessary. Following the adoption of chapter 447 in 1974, in which the Board of Regents was named "employer" for all faculty and professional employees in the university system (the Governor is the employer for all Career Service employees at the universities), the Public Employee Relations Commission held a unit determination proceeding in which the Commission created a single system-wide bargaining unit for all faculty and professional employees in the state, except those employed by the medical and law schools as well as the Institute for Food and Agricultural Sciences (IFAS) at the University of Florida. (The faculty of these units elected not to unionize.) The existence of 9 bargaining units (10 would be required now), the commission reasoned, would have resulted in what in labor relations is called a "whiplash effect" among 9 separate bargaining units. In that case, if one of the universities decided to pay its faculty more than others, the union representing the faculty whose salaries are lower would put pressure on their own institution for higher salaries, comparable to those at the other university. Ultimately, instead of dealing with a single employer and a single union, the Legislature would then be faced with ten different collective bargaining contracts. This, when compared to the current system, would be unnecessarily time consuming and expensive for the universities, the unions and the Legislature. Common Course Numbering System The creation of the common course numbering system, which enables community college transfers not to lose credit when transferring to a university, would probably have not been possible without the leadership of a statewide governing board. Such a numbering system is an important contributor to a seamless system of education in the state. University Boards Of Trustees Boards of Trustees for each individual institution would provide that institution and its president with a group of public-spirited men and women who can champion its cause, not only in the local community, but on a state and national level as well. Such a board could promote the sound development and allocation of resources of the institution it oversees. The board could serve as advisor to the president and the university administrators in the management of the university and assist the president in representing the university before the Board of Governors. The institutional board of trustees and university president would carry out those functions delegated to them by the Board of Governors-functions that could be better carried out at the institutional, rather than state level. Such responsibilities would likely include oversight and, when necessary, approval of matters relating to personnel administration, internal fund allocation, faculty recruitment, faculty governance, student admission and performance standards, student affairs, purchasing, university police and safety, intercollegiate athletics, fund raising, and physical development of the campus. The Trustees would conduct searches to replace university presidents and recommend candidates (more than one) for appointment to the Board of Governors. It is important that the ultimate decision on the selection and termination of presidents reside with the Board of Governors in order to maintain the highest standards throughout the university system-standards that would not be compromised by local circumstances. All universities now have well functioning foundation boards made up of outstanding citizens. Trustee boards should not interfere with, but fully support, the efforts of foundation boards. However, the presence of a Board of Trustees should relieve foundation boards of functions other than fund raising, which some have engaged in in the past. Boards of Trustees should not inject themselves into matters that should appropriately be the responsibility of the president. Such boards should be primarily responsible for developing and approving appropriate policies and not become involved in the operation and management of the university, the responsibility of the president. Let me repeat: no Florida university deserves to have a situation found in some institutions-where Boards of Trustees inappropriately inject themselves into the management of the university. I should also mention the role of trustees with respect to university athletic programs. Currently, Regents, appropriately, have no responsibility for university athletic programs. Such programs are the primary responsibility of the university president and the president should be held accountable for his actions in dealing with them. I am not sure of the situation at all Florida universities, but at the University of Florida all athletic programs and facility improvements are financed internally from funds generated by the Athletic Association. No state funds are involved and the Association is considered a university support program-not a state agency. Therefore, it should be treated differently from those agencies receiving state funds. A member of the Task Force, following the Jacksonville meeting, expressed concern to me that his impression was that "local boards" or University Boards of Trustees would be made up of individuals from the "local community" and would not draw upon the best people available at the state or national level. That is not my perception of the composition of "local boards." University boards of trustees should be made up of prominent individuals who have some special interest in the university to which he/she is being appointed. They could be outstanding alumni or non-alumni who might reside wherever interested and qualified individuals may be found. Certainly, Boards of Trustees for the University of Florida, Florida State University and Florida A&M should not be limited to residents of Alachua or Leon County. In other universities located in larger metropolitan areas, there will undoubtedly be individuals locally with outstanding qualifications to serve on Boards of Trustees. But even their members should not be limited to the area of the university. The important issue is to get people to serve who have the interest, commitment and qualifications to carry out their important responsibilities. Governing Versus Coordinating Boards for Universities At the Jacksonville Task Force Meeting there was brief discussion of the advantages and disadvantages of governing and coordinating bodies in university governance. Based on some 50 years of observations and experience, let me indicate a strong preference for university governing boards. Roughly half of the states have governing boards and half have coordinating boards. Of the four most populous states (California, New York, Texas and Florida), each with large, complex university systems, three of the four have governing boards. The exception, Texas, is unique in that while the state has a coordinating board, Texas has four multi-campus university systems: the University of Texas with 15 campuses, Texas A&M with ten units, the State University System (including four former teacher colleges), and the University of Houston with four campuses. Each of the four systems has governing boards. In addition to the four multi-campus systems, there are at least four other smaller institutions that are a part of the system. Significantly, the two largest and most prominent universities (the University of Texas and Texas A&M) have systems with governing boards-as is true in the other three most populous states. Case in Point I have intimate knowledge of one state that has a weak and ineffective coordinating body. In fact, a few years ago I served as a member of a legislatively mandated team that reviewed this coordinating body. The state has two major universities and six or so smaller ones, each with its own board of trustees. The state coordinating body is relatively ineffective in limiting the proliferation of programs, resulting in extensive unneeded and expensive duplication of effort. The two major universities, with prominent and politically connected board members, do essentially what they please. But even worse, the trustees of at least one of these universities get involved in the operations of the university in ways that many would say are totally inappropriate. The board chairman, a very powerful individual politically and economically, chairs the Trustees Athletic Committee and, from all indications, controls the university athletic programs, including the hiring and firing of football coaches, removing responsibility from the athletic director and the president. I was on that campus recently when the Alumni Association had its annual meeting to elect officers and new board members. I learned upon arriving on campus that a group, allegedly led by the trustees' board chairman, had proposed an alternate slate of candidates for the Alumni Association Board (alternate to that proposed by the Association) in order to gain control of the organization. When the Alumni Association learned of efforts to secure proxies for the alternate slate, the Association asked its members to fax their proxy votes for its proposed slate. However, the Alumni Association's fax machine was tied up for almost 24 hours before the annual meeting with bogus messages to keep alumni members from faxing their proxies to the association. The matter was taken to a circuit judge immediately who was incensed over the alternate slate group's tactics in tying up the Association's fax machine to keep it from receiving proxies, declaring the election invalid and calling for a new election. I provide details of this "horror story" to indicate how inappropriately a local board can function if there is no superior body with authority to control its actions when improper. Florida does not need a governance system with such a potential for inappropriate action. This could not happen with the structure proposed in my earlier paper entitled "A Modified Governance System for Florida Public Universities." Under this plan the Board of Governors would delegate authority to the Board of Trustees and could withdraw such authority if it was used inappropriately. The president of a major U.S. university, a long-time friend and colleague, called me several weeks ago inquiring about what was happening to the university system in Florida. He indicated that he had always regarded Florida's university governance system the most desirable model anywhere, expressing the wish that his state had something similar. (His state has a coordinating body.) I described the proposed structure submitted to the Task Force earlier, and he responded very favorably to it-as have many others in higher education, both in and out of Florida. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS In the current presidential campaign, both parties have identified "education" as one of the principal priority issues. It is appropriate and timely, therefore, for Florida to direct special attention to improving its education system-as the Legislature did last spring and as the Transition Task Force is now doing. There are obvious opportunities to develop a more unified and accountable education system, which, apparently, was a primary objective in the approval by the Legislature and the Governor of "Florida's Education Governance Reorganization Act of 2000." This paper addresses what should be the primary function of the State Board of Education and provides some observations relating to the governance of three divisions of the State's education system identified in the legislation: K-12, community colleges, and non-public education. The paper deals primarily, however, with the issue of an appropriate governance system for Florida's public universities. While all university governance systems, including Florida's, can be improved, this system, which has been in place for almost 35 years, has been widely regarded in education circles as one of the most effective in the nation. If any governance system is functioning appropriately, however, it must make some decisions that will be received unfavorably by some constituencies. This has happened frequently in Florida over the years. But in the 2000 session of the legislature, regents made a number of decisions that alienated many different groups in the legislature, contributing, some believe, to the legislative decision to abolish the regents and move to a different governance system. Whether this was or was not the primary reason for the legislative action is immaterial. The fact is that such action was taken and the State must deal with the consequences of this action. In my earlier paper to the Task Force dated October 6, 2000, I put forth a proposal for "A Modified Governance System for Florida's Universities." In this proposal I embraced major parts of the governance reorganization act of 2000 and suggested that these parts could lead to significant improvement in Florida's education system. However, I expressed the fervent view that it is absolutely essential to maintain an over-arching, system-wide, governing Board, between the university Boards of Trustees and the State Board of Education. Such an intermediate Board will be needed to deal with many issues that cannot be appropriately addressed by local boards of trustees and which are much too extensive and detailed to be handled by the State Board of Education. Moreover, to have 10 local boards going individually to the legislature would inevitably result in chaos and a maldistribution of resources. My views on this subject do not grow out of a desire to protect the regents or from any motive other than what is best for a good university system to which I have devoted a major part of my professional life. But I would not ask the Task Force to accept my views alone on this subject. I am sure that its members have read many strong editorials in Florida's major newspapers, universally negative and critical about that part of the legislation dealing with the governance of the university system. Moreover, during the legislative session the presidents of the 10 universities in the state's system approved, unanimously, a statement in opposition to the legislation. I have many friends and colleagues within Florida and around the country who have called or written me about this legislation and have yet to hear one of them say anything positive concerning what is proposed in this legislation for the governance of our universities. Before final action is taken by the Task Force on the university governance issue, I would strongly recommend that some highly respected leaders in higher education nationally be brought in to get their views on the subject. Let me suggest some names of individuals who are universally regarded and respected as outstanding leaders in higher education:
All three of these have had long tenures heading large multi-campus systems, like the one in Florida. A good friend and close colleague who has had a long and distinguished career in two of our state universities and in the system office sent me an email recently, suggesting that the Governor and the Chairman of the Task Force "need to ask themselves if they want to preside over something that would, by any measure, be a failure. In other words, they could pass the law, but it would end up being a colossal failure, and they would have to re-invent a state-wide governing board." Unfortunately, if this were to happen, great damage would be done in the meantime to what is unquestionably a good university system. I cannot believe the Task Force, the Legislature, or the Governor wants to see this happen. Error processing SSI file |